Safety vulnerability ID: 64636
The information on this page was manually curated by our Cybersecurity Intelligence Team.
The vulnerability identified in Label Studio, a popular open-source data labeling tool, allows an XSS attack through avatar upload. It affects versions prior to 1.9.2, where an authenticated user can upload a crafted image file that gets rendered as an HTML file on the website. This vulnerability could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript, potentially leading to malicious actions on Label Studio users who visit the crafted avatar image.
https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-q68h-xwq5-mm7x
Latest version: 1.17.0
Label Studio annotation tool
Label Studio is an a popular open source data labeling tool. Versions prior to 1.9.2 have a cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability that could be exploited when an authenticated user uploads a crafted image file for their avatar that gets rendered as a HTML file on the website. Executing arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image. The file `users/functions.py` lines 18-49 show that the only verification check is that the file is an image by extracting the dimensions from the file. Label Studio serves avatar images using Django's built-in `serve` view, which is not secure for production use according to Django's documentation. The issue with the Django `serve` view is that it determines the `Content-Type` of the response by the file extension in the URL path. Therefore, an attacker can upload an image that contains malicious HTML code and name the file with a `.html` extension to be rendered as a HTML page. The only file extension validation is performed on the client-side, which can be easily bypassed. Version 1.9.2 fixes this issue. Other remediation strategies include validating the file extension on the server side, not in client-side code; removing the use of Django's `serve` view and implement a secure controller for viewing uploaded avatar images; saving file content in the database rather than on the filesystem to mitigate against other file related vulnerabilities; and avoiding trusting user controlled inputs. See CVE-2023-47115.
MISC:https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/4.2/ref/views/#serving-files-in-development: https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/4.2/ref/views/#serving-files-in-development
MISC:https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.8.2/label_studio/users/functions.py#L18-L49: https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.8.2/label_studio/users/functions.py#L18-L49
MISC:https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.8.2/label_studio/users/urls.py#L25-L26: https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.8.2/label_studio/users/urls.py#L25-L26
MISC:https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/commit/a7a71e594f32ec4af8f3f800d5ccb8662e275da3: https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/commit/a7a71e594f32ec4af8f3f800d5ccb8662e275da3
MISC:https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-q68h-xwq5-mm7x: https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-q68h-xwq5-mm7x
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