Safety vulnerability ID: 64643
The information on this page was manually curated by our Cybersecurity Intelligence Team.
Label Studio before 1.10.1 fixes a remote import feature that allows users to import data from a remote web source. This feature could be exploited to download an HTML file that executes malicious JavaScript code within the context of the Label Studio website. An attacker could perform malicious actions on Label Studio users who visit the crafted avatar image. To mitigate this, it is recommended to set the Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; response header for all user-provided files downloaded by Label Studio. Also, restricting the allowed file extensions that can be downloaded is another suggested remediation strategy.
Latest version: 1.17.0
Label Studio annotation tool
Label Studio, an open source data labeling tool had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. Prior to version 1.10.1, this feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website. Executing arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image. `data_import/uploader.py` lines 125C5 through 146 showed that if a URL passed the server side request forgery verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL. The downloaded file path could then be retrieved by sending a request to `/api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}]` where `{project_id}` was the ID of the project and `{download_id}` was the ID of the downloaded file. Once the downloaded file path was retrieved by the previous API endpoint, `data_import/api.py`lines 595C1 through 616C62 demonstrated that the `Content-Type` of the response was determined by the file extension, since `mimetypes.guess_type` guesses the `Content-Type` based on the file extension. Since the `Content-Type` was determined by the file extension of the downloaded file, an attacker could import in a `.html` file that would execute JavaScript when visited. Version 1.10.1 contains a patch for this issue. Other remediation strategies are also available. For all user provided files that are downloaded by Label Studio, set the `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox;` response header when viewed on the site. The `sandbox` directive restricts a page's actions to prevent popups, execution of plugins and scripts and enforces a `same-origin` policy. Alternatively, restrict the allowed file extensions that may be downloaded. See CVE-2024-23633.
MISC:https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/sandbox: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/sandbox
MISC:https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/api.py#L595C1-L616C62: https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/api.py#L595C1-L616C62
MISC:https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py#L125C5-L146: https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py#L125C5-L146
MISC:https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-fq23-g58m-799r: https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-fq23-g58m-799r
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